The Ministry of Internal Affairs was one of Georgia’s biggest establishments in terms of the number of its employees, with a staff of 53 691. It was a centralized and militarized law enforcement establishment that aimed to ensure public order and security.

According to current Gregorian legislation, the activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs deal with many different spheres of public life. Indeed, its wide jurisdiction led to increased corruption within the ministry. It should be noted that during the last 10 years, the Ministry of Internal Affairs had the most powerful and the biggest monopoly in the law enforcement establishment. There was no balance between other law enforcement agencies and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Almost all spheres of public life were under its control.

What’s more, over the past 10 years, the level of corruption at the Ministry has steadily increased. One of the main reasons for the increased corruption was the difficult social situation in the country, which was pushing policemen to engage in the corruption. The government was ignoring this fact, salaries were not increasing, and what little salaries they had were paid with several months delay. In other words, the government was giving the right to policemen do as they wished. By doing this the government was creating a large group of corrupted policemen who were ready to carry out any order of the government, illegal orders.

During Soviet times, the government was expressing its appreciation to its “devoted law enforcers” by granting the staff of the Ministry of Internal Affairs all sorts of privileges. They enjoyed many benefits (communal expenses, free trips to resort areas, special shops, and more.) There was a considerable difference in payment between those who had just joined the Ministry and the ones with long work experience. Indeed, privileges grew in proportion to the number of years a person had worked in the Ministry. Both sides were happy: the government with its “corrupted structure” and the “structure” with its unofficial agreement with the government.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these privileges were abolished and the difference in payment came down to a minimum. Although social and other benefits were inadequate to prevent corruption even in Soviet times, once certain privileges were abolished, the corruption mechanism at the Ministry of Internal Affairs became even stronger. In a situation where they received no social benefits and existed in an unstable environment, the members of the Ministry acquired these privileges on their own by violating and misusing their power.

 As different divisions of the Ministry, each focused on a different area of the economy, learned to extort their salaries and benefits from the public, over time, the perfect “corruption mechanism” was created.

Political elite at the Ministry of Internal Affairs were the closest and the most devoted to the government; they were also the most reliable to execute any orders coming form the government. The scale of corruption and illegal activities depended on the particular person in charge of the Ministry, but it would not be correct to believe that even the Minister could change anything in this system. There was no political or personal will for the change. In other words, if a person did not obey the “political elite” or the elite of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, he would never come to power, while an obedient person would never try to change anything in this system. The role of the Minister was to carry out cosmetic changes within his capacity and create the illusion of doing or improving his job.

Despite what has been said above, individuals do create history and they can influence functioning of any strict, mechanistic management system.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs reached its culmination in corruption and illegal activities under Minister Kakha Targamadze in 1996-2001. He was a close ally of President Eduard Shevardnadze’s. Corruption especially flourished during his term in the office. There were a number of serious incidents where police not only supported illegal activities but also participated in them. The same is true of the Minister.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs was actively participated in supporting illegal business, protecting criminal masterminds, and lobbying drug business. Central and regional units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were protecting smuggling coming to Georgia from the uncontrolled territories of Abkhazia and so-called South Ossetia (also referred to as the Tskhinvali Region.)

Experts at the American University Transnational Crime and Corruption Center evaluated the scale and methods of smuggling in Georgia from 1996-2003. According to the research, different criminal groups, law enforcers, and government representatives worked together in the smuggling network. Criminal groups operated on the territories that are not or are partly controlled by the government of Georgia: Kodori Gorge, Gali, and Zugdidi Region. Georgian-Ossetian criminal groups operated in Tskhinvali-Gori and they were concentrated at Ergneti market (a border line of Georgia with so-called South Ossetia). They were transporting and trading smuggled goods. These groups were cooperating despite their different ethnicities or political orientations. These groups cooperated not only with different criminal groups but law enforcers and government representatives as well. Smuggled goods through the uncontrolled territories of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region pass to and from Russia, Turkey, and other counties. This is a very well designed corruption mechanism, which was protected by influential officials. All key participants (law enforcement structures, criminal groups, and Russian peacekeepers in the conflict zones) were in the successful smuggling network increasing its influence and attracting more people to the illegal trade. The mechanism was very complex and well-managed. This description is not merely a theory – it is based on facts.

Opposition TV channels and newspapers often broadcasted these facts but with no results. Here are few facts as examples broadcasted by program “60 Minutes,” a popular Georgian news program. In 2002, Kakha Targamadze as the Minister of Internal Affairs got permission from the National Security Council to purchase two helicopters. The Ministry of Internal Affairs transferred 250.000 USD to suspicious bank accounts in advance of the purchase, but the “purchased” helicopters never arrived. The helicopters that were to be purchased, belonged to a businessperson who was arrested on trumped-up charges and was forced to sign power of attorney over to a high ranking police officer. As a result, the officer got the power over this property. For a number of reasons, the helicopters were never made available to the Ministry. In the end, the Chamber of Control files indicate that the money was transferred but that the helicopters were not purchased.

In 2001, the Ministry of State Security arrested one Arab who had supposedly arrived in Georgia for suspicious reasons. The Arab paid 120.000 USD for his release, a fact that those who participated in extorting that money freely admitted. “60 Minutes” also reported that the money was divided among the ranking officers.

Moreover, “60 Minutes” filmed with a secret camera two high ranked policemen who were blackmailing people by planting drugs on them, arresting them, and forcing them to pay a fee for their won release. This was a very well known method of extortion, and the punishment for such policemen was only dismissal from work.

During these same years, there were wide human rights abuses and instances of torture by law enforcement officers. The NGO sector was doing its best to reveal each all such cases. And although they registered many instances of torture and killing, none of these cases were investigated.Speaking of the defense of human rights in those times was senseless.

It should be noted that the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security both played a negative role in supporting criminals in the Pankisi Gorge (on the border with the Russian republic of Chechnya). In the final years of President Shevardnadze’s term, the Pankisi Gorge was more or less cleared of criminals and drugs by the influence of the international community. However, Georgian mass media had for years been accusing law enforcement structures of taking no actions against instances of kidnapping and for being allied with different drug traffickers.

The kidnapping of British citizen Peter Shaw and Spanish businesspersons were both high-profile cases. These people were missing for a long time and were released in suspicious circumstances. Indeed, interrogation interviews of the Spanish businessmen were obtained and published in an influential Georgian newspaper. In those interviews, the Spanish businessmen openly spoke about the participation of law enforcement officers in the kidnapping.

It’s been three years since the brother of famous Georgian football player Kakhi Kaladze and the 14-year-old daughter of a Georgian  businessman were kidnapped. There is a probability that law enforcement officers were part of these kidnapping cases as well.

As for the personnel policy within law enforcement structures, it was completely under the control of the governing elite. Appointing individuals to important positions in this system aimed to make them blend into this system of “unwritten laws” and be part of the “corruption pyramid.” Positions in the system were effectively being sold according to the established prices. People were ready to pay not only to get the job but also they were prepared to continue paying the higher ranking officers during their term, which meant that they were bound indefinitely to the corruption network. Paying for a position in the law enforcement structures was not easy because it had to be done through a middleman, a trusted person who was part of or close to the political elite.

The above facts are mostly related to the period of President Shevadnadze’s term in office.

In 2001-2003, young Koba Narchemashvili became the Minister of Internal Affairs after Kakha Targamadze resigned. Koba Narchemashvili was appointed as Minister of Internal Affairs after holding the position of the deputy minister in charge of the investigative department. During his term in the office he did not carry out any structural changes at the ministry. He only replaced Targamadze’s staff by his trusted people.

In 2001, there were massive protests for freedom of speech caused by attacks on the independent TV company Rustavi-2 by the investigative department of the Ministry of State Security. The investigators initiated a criminal case against the company accusing it of hiding taxes. The company was at the time the most influential opposition TV company and was actively criticizing the government for existing corruption, for the poor economic situation, and for the culture of impunity in the country. Its program “60 Minutes,” which was unveiling the criminal and illegal activities of influential persons in the government, had the highest rating of all TV programs.

In November 2003, President Shevardnadze was forced resign along with the leaders of the law enforcement ministries.

Koba Narchemashvili was arrested after the Rose Revolution in October 2004 for violating customs regulations and illegal customs clearance of cars. He pled innocence and declared that he was being persecuted for loyalty to Shevardnadze. Nevertheless, after he paid 300 000 Lari to the state budget, he was released from prison on December 31, 2004 and the case against him was suspended.

The role of police during the Rose Revolution is very interesting. After Kakha Targamadze resigned from his position, where he had effectively served as the sole leader of the law enforcement system with immense power and influence, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was left without an “Iron Man.” His replacement, the young Koba Narchemashvili, could not control the thoroughly corrupt and centralized ministry. This became starkly evident in the days of Rose Revolution. Despite the fact that Mr. Narchemashvili remained loyal to President Shevardnadze to the end, he could not maintain control over his ministry. Different law enforcement divisions were moving to the side of the protesters, and this was not causing any problems among the thousands of people gathered in front of the Parliament. Indeed, the Rose Revolution was possible in part because of the unification of the people, the police, and the army around one idea. Even members of the most corrupt departments were sick of the old, outdated system.

After the Rose Revolution, nearly all of the senior officials in the law enforcement system (Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of State Security, General Prosecutor’s Office) were replaced. The new officials were young political leaders who differed from their predecessors in their mentality and their way of life. Most have a strong orientation toward the West, and society is expecting a realization of these values in public and political life. These people for years have been fighting next to Mikheil Saakashvili and are trusted people by the new President.

It is interesting to note that many of the current heads of the law enforcement ministries were professionally successful during the previous government. Even Mikheil Saakashvili himself was the Minister of Justice during Shevardnadze’s term, while Zurab Zhvania, the current Prime Minister, was Chairman of the Parliament for two terms. Likewise, Nino Burjanadze, the current Chairman of the Parliament, held the same job during Shevardnadze’s term.

Indeed, in the upper echelons of the government, there are very few new faces. For the most part, responsibilities and mandates were simply passed from one group to another. The same can be said about those in charge of law enforcement structures. After the Rose Revolution, the roles were distributed in the following way: Irakli Okruashvili, (previously Saakashvili’s deputy during his term as the Minister of Justice) became Prosecutor General; Gia Baramidze, (previously Chairman of the Parliament Committee on State Security) became Minister of Internal Affairs; and Zurab Adeishvili (previously Chairman of Parliamentary Committee on Law) became Minister of State Security.

During Irakli Okruashvili’s term as Prosecutor General, the government embarked on a wide campaign to arrest corrupt government officials. This was the first time in many years that government officials were arrested. The Prosecutor’s office took several steps to restore justice, which gave hope to people while at the same time raising the stature and the authority of the Prosecutor General. At the same time, the political opposition and certain parts of society strongly criticized Okruahsvili’s treatment of former government officials as unjust. Although there were procedural violations, which cast doubt on the rule of law in society, Irakli Okruashvili still maintains trust and sympathy among the population.

Many of the former officials who were arrested by the current government were able to secure their release by paying huge fines to the government. As a result, more than a million lari (local currency, $ 1 is equal to 1.80 lari) went to the state budget, a fact of which the current government is very proud. The NGO sector, the legal community, and academic experts have made many negative remarks in connection with the criminal law policy of Irakli Okruashvili, but it is a fact that he was and still remains a man of strict principals who is assigned some of the most difficult tasks in the government. This is why he was appointed to three different positions in the government after the revolution. After serving as Prosecutor General, he continued as the Minister of Internal Affairs and is now the Minister of Defense.

What does such rapid changing of positions in the government mean for Okruashvili and for the government at large? Can one and the same person be an effective prosecutor general, minister of internal affairs and minister of defense? Why does the government change leadership in the law enforcement structures as often as it does?  In seeking to understand the government’s politics and personnel policy, Irakli Okruashvili can serve as a useful case study.

In the case of Okruashvili’s appointment as the Minister of Internal Affairs the aim of the government was to conduct thorough reforms at the ministry and Okruashvili with his image of a ”strict and  principled man” was a good candidate. During his term as Minister, the patrol police were created, the staff of the ministry decreased by 16 022 persons, and the average salary increased from 80-90 Lari up to 350-500 Lari. It should be noted at the same time that under his tenure, armed conflict in South Ossetia resumed. In June 2004, the separatist authorities of South Ossetia became very aggressive about the closing of Ergneti market, which the Georgian government had closed down because it was full of smuggled goods brought from Russia.

Gia Baramidze, like Okruashvili, changed his position for the third time at the end of last year.

During Shevardnadze’s presidency, Baramidze was a big supporter of Saakashvili and served as the chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on State Defense. After the revolution, he was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs (a post he claimed to have always desired) where he stayed for just a few months. As Minister of Internal Affairs, Baramaidze worked out a general strategy for reforms at the ministry. Under his leadership, the ministry fought against criminal authorities and Baramdize was praised for his work, though of course there is still so much to do in this respect. The young minister was very proud of the ministry’s successful efforts in conducting reforms and there was no official reason given why he was replaced just a few months into his job.

What logic was there in moving Baramidze from Minister of Internal Affairs to the position of Minister of Defense and then to the position of State Minister on Integration with European Union. It seems when there is staff change in this government, logic is  of minimal importance. Some have speculated that appointments in this government are based not on professionalism or competence but only on loyalty to the president and his party. This belief has caused skepticism towards the reforms in the country. How otherwise can we explain the fact that Zurab Adeishvili, the current Prosecutor General and the President’s closest supporter, was a short while ago Minister of State Security? He was very active in the events that took place in Adjara. (In May 2004, as a result of massive protests, the leader of the Adjara Autonomous Republic of Georgia, who for years had refused to subordinate himself to the central authority, was forced to leave not only his position but also the country and seek shelter in the Russian Federation.) In July 2004, Zurab Adeishvili was moved to the position of Prosecutor General. He was replaced at the Ministry of State Security by Vano Merabishvili who was recently appointed the Minister of Public order and Police.

As a result of these staff changes a new person in the face of Vano Merabishvili emerged in the political arena who like Okruashvili and Adeishvili is a close friend and a supporter of the President. Merabishvili, like many other members of the government, was a distinguished member of the previous government, serving at one point as leader of the parliamentary majority.

As already mentioned, one of the first major set of reform after the ”Rose Revolution” was carried out at the law enforcement structures. It is understandable that the leading positions within these structures were distributed among members of the ruling party but personnel policy and in particular endless personnel changes in the government have cast doubts on the government’s professionalism.

As part of the reforms at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, thousands of employees were dismissed. The number of the employees had been artificially increased during Soviet times and a reduction was long overdo. However, optimization should have been based on complex testing of the employees for their knowledge, experience, and morale. There are currently no clear criteria for what qualifies a person to be a policeman or a beginner at any position.

Unfortunately despite the fact that society in general supports reforms, there are complaints that the government’s personnel policy is unfair. While the turnover of staff at nearly every ministry has been significant, few ministries have developed criteria by which to judge candidates. As a result, many professionals lost their jobs in the process of reforms. Complaints are caused because connections are still needed to maintain or get a position. Although it is reasonable for the ruling party to control the top leadership posts, this does not mean that they should distribute jobs only to those who they know or who have been recommended by trusted people.

In regard to the police, there has been one interesting and positive development. The current  corps of patrol police is a completely new institution in the country, which was created after the Rose Revolution.  Most of the population sympathize with it and trust the new police. Mistrust towards police  left over from years past is slowly changing into respect. Surveys of trust among the population show a significant increase for the last year. By the research of one sociological center, 51% of those interviewed trust police and 53% declare that they report to the police about incidents. These indicators are significantly higher compared to the ones from previous years. Of course, there is criticism as well directed at a lack of professionalism of policemen in critical situations. A couple of months ago, a 19-year-old young man died in a suspicious situation as a result of a shooting by a policemen. Policemen should be more careful in critical situations. They were given weapons after short trainings and have the right to shoot in emergency situations. Often it is not clear when the situation is an emergency.

As for the combat with corruption, the country’s most acute problem, serious steps have been taken in this direction. All that has been done cannot compare with what remains to be done in this respect but no one has illusions that this problem can be resolved in just a few years. What is important is that there are positive tendencies in this direction.

As mentioned above, many government officials were arrested who later paid “their share” to the budget in exchange for freedom. No one doubts or questions the legitimacy of these arrests, but the question is how these people were selected of the many corrupt officials in the old government. Many individuals notorious for their corrupt activities still enjoy freedom and in some cases positive relations with the government. Moreover, there was a lot of criticism regarding procedural violations at the moments of arrests.

A few officials in the new government have been publicly accused of corruption. Some of these corrupt officials were employees of law enforcement structures. Of course, there continue to be instances of corruption, which is natural, since one year is insufficient time for global changes in the country. People know they should be more patient, and they are, but they also are looking at the upcoming processes very carefully.   

Experts note that administrative measures alone are not enough to eliminate corruption; a systematic and global approach needs to be applied.

Everyone agrees that government officials should have adequate salaries. A number of steps were taken to resolve this issue, but they were not very effective in the case of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. For example, by the decision of the leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and based on the structural specifics of the ministry, supplements to the salaries were allocated from the state fund. The heads of the structural divisions (departments) in the ministry were put in charge of distributing these funds, but the salary increases were not systematic or logical. Even the increased salaries are barely enough to pay for normal living conditions. People know this is because of the country’s poor economic situation and the government’s good will is not enough to resolve this problem, but they also know that all these processes should have been better organized.

Besides political or personal will there are many other factors that are necessary for combating corruption. Experts talk about the negative sides of recent reforms, such as poor professionalism and other errors. It is a fact that the country cannot come out of its difficult situation so easily, but once more people want to be sure that the way the government has chosen is correct. For now, it seems fair to say that most people are still observing.  

One of the most interesting aspects of post-revolution reforms is how the government is conducting its relations with law enforcement structures. The new government, led by the new generation of political leaders, has the political will to aggressively direct the country’s development. It also has a new vision of how to manage changes in the country. The current government claims to control every division of the government administration. In parallel with calling for the decentralization of state power, which is a necessary provision for building a democratic country, there is a tendency towards centralization of power. Today political power is striving to match influence with the law enforcement elite, or in other words, to identify itself with the law enforcement structures. This attitude is embodied in the drive to have a united political group and by the statement that everything old is “rotten” and is “garbage.” By extension, the new vision of the current government is good because it is not ”old.” Such statements have made politically active parts of society think that power is being privatized. Nevertheless, society is patient and loyal to the current political events because it thinks today is better than yesterday and tomorrow should be even better.

The developing of civil society in Georgia is an unalterable process. Society is paying significant attention to the political processes that are defining the country’s destiny. People believe that this is almost the last chance that Georgia has to became a real state. As a result, they are very careful to evaluate the policies and reforms of the government. They are loyal to the government, but at the same time they are taking a sober view of its policies, ready to protest in due time if it is necessary. The balance of power between society and the government shouldn’t be destroyed if the country wants to build the state on real democratic values.  But still society is sitting on a scale waiting for better times, and hoping that the scale does not tip the other way.