The Orthodox Church views itself as an organisation that represents the religious interests of the majority of the Russian population. As such, since the early 1990s, it has requested permission to engage in pastoral activities in social spheres inaccessible during the Soviet era – notably those depending on the Army and Power ministries1.

However, while the Church has found a common language with military leaders insofar as "patriotic education" is concerned, it has had no positive effect on improving soldiers' morale or in the fight against dedovshchina2.

There is a significant gap between the Church's public support of the Russian army, its discourse in favour of patriotism, its support of the war in Chechnya, and the role priests in fact confine themselves to inside military units, which is strictly spiritual.

Indeed, interviews with soldiers show that one of their main problems is the fact that priests consider their role to be a uniquely religious one – soldiers coming to them with questions and problems of a social or psychological nature are sent back to the commanders. Therefore, as Joris Van Bladel puts it, structurally speaking, priests are not differentiated from commanders: they do not represent an alternative medium of communication with the officer corps or the external world as they do in Western armies3. (Nor, incidentally, do medical doctors play the psychological and social role that could be expected of them: first of all, because “respect for the soldier’s privacy” does not in fact exist; and secondly, because medical decisions can easily be overruled by the commander, thus placing physicians within the military hierarchy.)

Furthermore, another aspect of  priests/army relationships deserves closer scrutiny: in recent years, it has been observed that retired officers have been entering the priesthood in numbers after failing to adapt to civilian life. Many of them, although they officially condemn dedovshchina, seem  in fact - may be by analogy with religious obediance-,  to passively  support its system. Besides, members of the Orthodox Church are beginning to observe the dissemination of army mentality, of archaic violence produced by the Russian army among the religious community:

What could then be expected from “militarized” priests ?

Finaly, since surveys show that soldiers do not spontaneously go to church5, the Russian Ministry of Defense should perhaps take into account the fact that religious feeling is not very prevalent in the military.

All this makes the February 2006 announcement by the Department of Ideological Work of the Ministry of Defense - stating that the Russian Orthodox Church and the military have reached an agreement on the joint training of army priests, and that a nationwide experiment will take place reintegrating priestly services in the troops6 - a cause for concern.

Obviously, the announcement is in response to the brutal hazing of soldier Sychev, which resulted in the amputation of his legs and genitals.

Apart from the added risk of increasing inter-ethnic hostility within the army through the introduction of Orthodox priests (other religions are not represented in the armed forces)7, this new measure proves the absence of long term expertise in the Russian military today on very serious questions, among them dedovshchina.

This is confirmed by the recent disappearance of sociological research centres – whose recommendations were not followed anyway – inside the Russian Ministry of Defense.